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VII. SPOLIATION OF DISCOVERABLE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE *
A. Introduction
Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence,
or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in
pending or future litigation.' Such document destruction 2 is and
ought to be proscribed.
1. Contemporary Significance of Spoliation
Gregory P. Joseph has suggested "[t]he lasting legal legacy of
the current era of electronic discovery likely will lie in the area of
spoliation and sanctions." 3 This section will delineate the policy
reasons against the destruction of evidence and will conclude with a
brief discussion of the qualitative differences between the
illegitimate destruction of tangible versus electronic evidence.
* Rena Durrant: J.D. Candidate May, 2006, Loyola Law School; B.A.,
Sociology, summa cum laude California State University, Los Angeles, June
2003. This piece is dedicated to my husband Glen, my parents, and siblings
for their inspiration and unconditional love. Special thanks to my law school
study group---the brightest group of women I know-for their support and
laughter when I needed it most.
1. See, e.g., MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Moulton, No. 03 Civ. 3613 (VM)
(MHD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,376, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004);
Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100
(D. Md. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 284 (E.D.
Va. 2001).
2. The term "document destruction" in this article means the destruction or
significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for
another's use as evidence in pending or future litigation.
3. Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Spoliation, COMPUTER & INTERNET
LAW., July, 2003, at 16. It is also worth noting that "electronic discovery has
moved from an unusual activity encountered in large cases to a frequently-seen
activity, used in an increasing proportion of the litigation filed in federal
courts." COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMM. 2 (2004) [hereinafter ADVISORY], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2005/CVAug04.pdf.
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a. Policy reasons against the destruction of evidence
The absence of evidentiary proof "may stymie the search for the
truth. ' 4  Because discovery is an integral part of the adversary
system, the process itself would become ineffectual if parties began
to "circumvent discovery requests by selectively destroying
potentially damaging information." 5 As such, "when a charge is
made that relevant information has been destroyed, and especially
when a charge is made of intentional destruction, it is a charge that
strikes at the core of our civil litigation system." 6 Spoliation can lead
to "manifest unfairness and injustice," by increasing both "the risk of
an erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of
action" and "the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct
the destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence that may be less
persuasive, less accessible or both.",
7
b. Qualitative differences between the
destruction of electronic versus tangible evidence
"Lawyers know how to review, shepherd, and maintain paper.
Electronic data are another matter." 8 In some ways, the increased
use of electronic evidence during the course of discovery has been
beneficial to litigators. Unlike tangible documents, electronic data
can exist for a virtually limitless period of time.9  Retaining
electronic data is also less burdensome, given that the data occupy
very little space.1
0
Electronic discovery can also be a litigator's worst nightmare.
Although electronic data consume very little space, the burden of
producing such data is often overwhelming." For example, a party
4. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 214.
5. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 606 n.5 (7th Cir.
2001).
6. Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828,
829 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
7. Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 285 (E.D. Va. 2001).
8. Joseph, supra note 3, at 16.
9. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with
Discovery of Electronic Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 268
(2001).
10. See, e.g., id.
11. The most prominent distinction between electronic and tangible
discovery is "the exponentially greater volume that characterizes electronic
1804
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who is asked for "electronic records" may have to locate and produce
"voice mail, e-mail, deleted e-mail, data files, program files, back-up
files, archival tapes, temporary files, system history files, web site
information in textual, graphical or audio format, web site files,
cache files, 'cookies' and other electronically stored information."
12
Just as there are many types of electronic records, there are also a
variety of locations in which those records may be housed. Finding
the relevant data may require the producing party to search through
"desk-top computers, laptops, PDA's, employee home computers,
back-up and archival data, and systems files" and may even call for
the use of special search methods.13
Furthermore, "[a]s documents are increasingly maintained
electronically, it has become easier to delete or tamper with
evidence."' 14  A computer's "delete" function does not actually
destroy data; it merely makes the data available for overwriting if
that particular space on the computer's hard disk is needed in the
future. 15 Conversely, "information stored in electronic form is easily
data," because it makes electronic discovery "more burdensome, costly, and
time-consuming." ADVISORY, supra note 3, at 2. For a more specific
illustration of the qualitative differences between electronic and tangible
evidence, consider the following:
A floppy disk, with 1.44 megabytes, is the equivalent of 720
typewritten pages of plain text. A CD-ROM, with 650 megabytes, can
hold up to 325,000 typewritten pages. One gigabyte is the equivalent
of 500,000 typewritten pages. Large corporate computer networks
create backup data measured in terabytes, or 1,000,000 megabytes:
each terabyte represents the equivalent of 500 billion typewritten
pages of plain text.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th) § 11.446 (quoted in ADVISORY,
supra note 3, at 12) [hereinafter MANUAL].
12. Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D.
93, 96 (D. Md. 2003) (citing omitted).
13. Id. at 97.
14. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see Marcus, supra note 9, at 267 (noting that electronic discovery increases the
risk of "phony evidence").
15. Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 96; ADVISORY, supra note 3, at 2; Marcus,
supra note 9, at 64; Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal
Civil Litigation, 2000 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 5 (2000); Michael Marron,
Comment, Discoverability of "Deleted" E-Mail: Time For a Closer
Examination, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 895, 907-08 (2002) (reminding readers
that "[c]ontrary to what most people believe, it is extremely difficult for the
average, technologically unsophisticated, e-mail user to render an unwanted e-
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changed, overwritten, or obliterated by everyday use of the
computer."' 16  Although the deleted data may or may not be
retrievable, courts have nonetheless held that Fed R. Civ. P. 34
entitles parties to request deleted data from their adversaries. 
17
2. Current State of the Law
Courts have found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the
unique nuances of electronic discovery with the existing federal
rules. 18  Case law on electronic spoliation is sparse and often
inconsistent, 19 so many courts have turned to other jurisdictions for
answers to resolve disputes on this issue. No unified test or set of
considerations has been developed to apply to circumstances of
spoliation. While most courts agree on the major spoliation
elements (e.g., duty to preserve and breach of that duty), some
jurisdictions have developed their own tests for the more minute
spoliation considerations (e.g., the factors to consider when deciding
whether to impose a default judgment). As such, this section will
delineate the overarching test for spoliation while also pointing out
any jurisdictional deviations from the majority rule.
B. Breach of the Duty to Preserve
1. Introduction
A party may only be held culpable for spoliating evidence that it
was under a duty to preserve. 2 1 The duty to preserve, however, is an
mail message unrecoverable.... In the context of e-mail messages, therefore,
delete does not mean delete.").
16. Withers, supra note 15, at 2; see ADVISORY, supra note 3, at 3 (stating
that the "ordinary operation of computers-including the simple act of turning
a computer on or off or accessing a particular file-can alter or destroy
electronically stored information").
17. See, e.g., Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 96; Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook
Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn. 2002); Simon Prop. Group L.P.
v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Playboy Enters. v.
Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
18. See ADVISORY, supra note 3, at 3.
19. Id.
20. Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 287 (E.D. Va. 2001).
21. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(noting that such a requirement "goes without saying"); see also Renda
Marine, Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 57, 60 (2003) (referring to the duty to
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affirmative obligation, 22 requiring a party to preserve any and all
properly discoverable evidence to the extent permissible under Fed
R. Civ. P. 26.23
This section will delineate two ways in which the duty to
preserve can arise. It will conclude with a brief discussion of
document retention policies and their relationship with the duty to
preserve.
2. When the Duty to Preserve Arises
a. Litigation
The duty to preserve evidence arises when a "party has notice
that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation." 24 In
other words, a party must begin its preservation efforts once "it
reasonably anticipates" involvement in a suit.25 Notice of impending
preserve evidence as a "threshold issue" in deciding spoliation matters);
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 281 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(stating that a movant must show that the adverse party had a duty to preserve
evidence in order to establish his spoliation claim); Liafail, Inc. v. Learning
2000, Inc., Nos. 01-599 GMS & 01-678 GMS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24803, at *9 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 2002) (noting that'spoliation requires a showing
that "the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to timely
produce it."); Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 286 (explaining that that there would be no
wrongdoing in destroying relevant documents if the duty to preserve did not
exist).
22. Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828,
869 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices
Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 615 (D.N.J. 1997)).
23. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19128, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2003); Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) at 870; Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp.,
220 F.R.D. 429, 434 (W.D. Pa. 2004); Thompson v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D. Md. 2003). It is worth noting that
a party is not required to preserve every minutia of evidence. See Zubulake,
220 F.R.D. at 217 (noting that a party is not under an obligation to preserve
"every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every backup
tape"). For a detailed discussion of the scope of electronic discovery, see
supra Part III.
24. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216 (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express
Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Rambus, 220 F.R.D. at 281;
Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 287.
25. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217.
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litigation typically stems from receipt of pre-litigation
correspondence, or service of the complaint, the answer, or discovery
requests.
26
Although a party must be vigilant with respect to preservation in
anticipation of potential for litigation, it need not be unrealistic. For
example, an entire company does not need to begin its preservation
efforts if only one or two employees contemplate the possibility that
a fellow employee might sue. If contemplation of the possibility of
an imminent suit becomes widespread, however, the company's duty
to preserve will obviously arise.28
b. Motion to preserve
A party that fears its adversary might destroy documents may
file a motion for a preservation order.29 A court30 may issue this
injunctive remedy upon "an adequate showing that equitable relief is
warranted., 31  Although such preservation orders have become
"increasingly routine in cases involving electronic evidence," 32 the
moving party bears the burden of convincing the court that the
destruction of discoverable evidence is more than a mere
26. Lisa M. Arent et al., EDiscovery: Preserving, Requesting & Producing
Electronic Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 131,
138 (2002).
27. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217.
28. Id. (duty to preserve arose where plaintiffs colleague sent an e-mail
detailing the allegations to plaintiff's current and former supervisor and
another colleague).
29. Madden v. Wyeth, No. 3-03-CV-0167-R, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6427,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. April 16, 2003).
30. All Article I courts, including federal claims courts, as well as Article
III courts, possess the inherent authority to issue motions to preserve. Pueblo
of Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 135-37 (2004). Such authority is
founded in a court's power to prevent abuses of process and its ability to
preserve relevant evidence. Id. at 137.
31. Madden, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6427, at *2.
32. Laguna, 60 Fed. CI. at 136; see also Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens
Westinghouse Power Corp., 220 F.R.D. 429, 431 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (stating that
"orders directing parties to preserve materials or documents are common in
circumstances in which evidence is subject to being destroyed or lost in routine
and sometimes not-so-routine deletion or destruction of information.").
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possibility.33  Because all litigants are under a duty to preserve
evidence without such an order, a court should only issue a motion to
preserve under special circumstances, such as when there is a clear
threat of irreparable harm.
34
One district court has articulated a three-prong test for
determining the appropriateness of a preservation order.35 This test
requires the court to consider the following factors:
1) the level of concern the court has for the continuing
existence and maintenance of the integrity of the evidence
in question in the absence of an order directing preservation
of the evidence; 36 2) any irreparable harm likely to result to
the party seeking the preservation of evidence absent an
order directing preservation; 37 and 3) the capability of an
individual, entity, or party to maintain the evidence sought
to be preserved, not only as to the evidence's original form,
condition or contents, but also the physical, spatial and
financial burdens created by ordering evidence
preservation.
38
Furthermore, the permissible scope of preservation orders has
become increasingly narrow. 39  Broad or "blanket" preservation
orders, which "call[] on the responding party to immediately halt all
operations that can result in the destruction or alteration of computer
33. Madden, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6427, at *2-*4 (preservation order
was inappropriate where plaintiff could not show that defendants would
"flaunt" their preservation duties).
34. Id. at *2-*3. A court should not be inclined to enter a preservation
order "[w]ithout some proof that evidence may be lost or destroyed without"
one. Id. at *4.
35. Capricorn, 220 F.R.D. at 433-34.
36. Id. at 433. The "absence of any significant past, present or future threat
to the continuing integrity or existence of the evidence" would render a
preservation order "superfluous." Id. at 434.
37. Id. at 433. "The loss or destruction of certain evidence can result in
significant prejudice to the party seeking to use it in proving the party's
claims." Id. at 435.
38. Id. at 433-34. "Considerations such as storage space, maintenance and
storage fees, and physical deterioration of the evidence are just a few of the
considerations to be evaluated when considering this final factor." Id. at 435-
36.
39. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Electronic Discovery: Questions and
Answers, Civ. ACTION, Summer 2004, at 4.
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data," are unreasonable because they may "put a computer-
dependent company out of business."40 Thus, if a court finds that a
preservation order is warranted, the order should be "narrowly
tailored" and describe, "with particularity, what the scope of
discovery will be. ... "41
3. A Note on Document Retention Policies
In practical terms, the duty to Treserve evidence simply
obligates parties to behave reasonably. Because of the unique
nature of electronic data, parties may take considerable latitude in
choosing reasonable preservation methods.43 Such latitude can
become a double-edged sword, however, since parties who fail to
exercise any one of a myriad of options cannot be found to have
behaved reasonably in the eyes of the law.
44
40. Id. (stating that "[tlwenty years ago, a document preservation order
might inconvenience the back office of a company, but the assembly line and
sales continued. In the information economy, the computer system functions
not only as the back office, but also as the assembly line and sales operation.")
(emphasis added); see ADVISORY, supra note 3, at 7-8 (noting that suspending
document destruction "could paralyze a party's operations").
41. Nat'l Ctr. For State Courts, supra note 39, at 4. In order to ensure that
the preservation order is narrowly tailored, the court should take into account
the requesting party's scope of discovery and "the nature of [the responding
party's] data collection and its ability to preserve the relevant data." Id.
42. Id. at 3 (asserting that "[t]he central element of a company's duty to
preserve is to act reasonably and in good faith").
43. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
For example, a litigant could choose to retain all then-existing backup
tapes for the relevant personnel (if such tapes store data by individual
or the contents can be identified in good faith and through reasonable
effort), and to catalog any later-created documents in a separate
electronic file. That, along with a mirror-image of the computer
system taken at the time the duty to preserve attaches ... creates a
complete set of relevant documents.
Id. It is also worth noting that "virtually all companies have document
retention policies." Rambus, Inc. v. Infmeon Tech. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 285
(E.D. Va. 2004).
44. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19128, at *1 (N.D. Ill Oct. 24, 2003). Wiginton concerned a sexual
harassment suit brought by an employee against her former employer. Id. at
*2. Defendant failed to preserve the computer hard-drives, e-mail accounts,
and Internet records of those who had specifically been charged with
harassment, claiming that the search for relevant documents would have been
1810
Parties can also breach the duty to preserve when their document
retention policies are themselves unreasonable in light of
preservation requirements.4 5 "[A] records retention policy which is
inconsistent with a party's obligations to a potential or actual
adversary in litigation [does not] excuse the party's failure to respond
to discovery."4 6 Put simply, "'[a] party cannot destroy documents
based solely on its own version of the proper scope of the
complaint.' 4 7  Furthermore, parties run the risk of heightening
judicial suspicion when they conveniently tailor their document
retention policies to reflect their litigation strategies.48
Although legally-compliant document retention policies appear
simple in theory, creating them can be extremely problematic.
Companies typically implement such policies with their own
business needs in mind rather than in ways that would facilitate
discovery.4 9 This tension between business and litigation obligations
has been referred to as "the greatest" of the "discovery-related issues
that trouble corporations" and is described in detail below:
50
Up to now, most cases involving substantial electronic
discovery have involved major corporations. In creating a
digital recordkeeping system, a business's first set of
too costly. Id. at * 15-* 17. The court was unconvinced by this argument since
Defendant could have exercised other, less cost-prohibitive options, such as
implementing e-mail filters or conducting keyword searches. Id. at * 17-* 18.
45. See, e.g., Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 57, 61
(2003); Rambus, 220 F.R.D. at 283-87.
46. Renda Marine, 58 Fed. Cl. at 61. In Renda Marine, Defendant's
retention policy, implemented over a year after it was put on notice of potential
litigation, instructed employees to delete e-mails after they had been read. Id.;
see also Rambus, 220 F.R.D. at 286 (reminding that even "valid purging
program[s]" must be put on hold when litigation is on the horizon).
47. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at *15 (quoting Diersen v.
Walker, No. 00 C 2437, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9538, at *5 (N.D. I11. June 6,
2003)).
48. See Rambus, 220 F.R.D. at 287 (noting the court's expression of its
suspicion where the spoliating party "was developing both a... litigation
strategy and its document retention program at the same time").
49. See, e.g., McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2001)
(noting that, unlike paper documents, back-up tapes are not catalogued by
subject matter, which lends to the possibility of arduous discovery); Nat'l Ctr.
For State Courts, supra note 39, at 3.
50. Nat'l Ctr. For State Courts, supra note 39, at 3.
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concerns focuses on having the system perform all the
business-related operations functions at the lowest cost, and
out of the myriad of records created, identifying those with
sufficient long-term importance to retain. General legal
liability concerns are layered on top of this prime focus.
Litigation-related issues such as discovery are
superimposed on these basic operational dictates.
Preserving and finding the requested files among the
millions that are created annually becomes an enormous and
difficult undertaking. The impact on operations and
expense is exacerbated by the fact that few large businesses
have the luxury of dealing with only one discovery request
at a time. Depending on the company, there may be
anywhere from dozens to thousands of tort, commercial,
class action, regulatory, and employment cases proceeding
simultaneously.
51
Although companies cannot completely eliminate the burdens of
preservation,52 they can take steps to minimize such burdens. For
example, it is in a company's best interest to create a retention policy
that specifically addresses how its Internet technology [IT]
department "is to implement and ensure compliance across all IT
systems and equipment." 53 The company can take further action by
creating a policy that anticipates potentially disruptive effects on
employee practices.
54
4. Recovering Deleted Data
Fed R. Civ. P. 34 treats deleted data as a "document" for
purposes of discoverability. 55 As a result, a party should make all
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., id. (discussing breadth of safe harbor created by proper
document retention policy).
53. PRACTISING LAW INST., ORDER No. 2855, DISCOVERY AND USE OF
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 449 (2004).
54. Id. at 448. "For example, many desktop computers automatically store
e-mail to the computer's hard drive. Even if employees delete e-mail properly,
copies of e-mails may still exist on the hard drive in residual-and
discoverable-form." Id.
55. E.g., Simon Prop. Group. v. mySimon Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D.
Ind. 2000). For a detailed discussion of what constitutes a document for
purposes of electronic discovery, see supra Part II.
1812
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attempts to recover deleted data. It can do so in one of several ways.
First, a party can hire a computer forensics expert who will
attempt to restore the deleted data. Because deleted data may remain
on a computer's hard disk or on removable storage media for months
or years, "restoring the deleted data is a relatively simple task" for a
trained expert.56 It should be noted, however, that hiring such an
expert can be very costly and results are not guaranteed.
57
If hiring an expert is not a viable option, a party should inspect
its backup tapes. Many individuals and most companies
"periodically backup their data onto tapes or disks for disaster
recovery purposes." 58  Most data-even those that have been
deleted, edited, or written over-can be found in those backup
tapes.59
The difficulty, however, arises once it comes time to locate the
desired data. Because the data on a backup tape are not organized
for retrieval of individual documents or files, but for wholesale,
emergency uploading onto a computer system, the organization of
the data mirrors the computer's structure rather than human records
management structure. Because of the burdens that flow from the
backup tapes' form of organization, opposing counsel "should be
prepared to demonstrate that [backup tape] discovery is necessary
and germane to the case."
61
Because data restoration and backup tape inspection can delay
and increase the cost of discovery, a party may condition the
restoration or retrieval on the requesting party's paying some or all
of the costs.
62
56. Withers, supra note 15, at 5; see Marron, supra note 15, at 897 (noting
that it is "increasingly common for a party to request that the opposing party
recover and produce... deleted e-mail messages through use of special
'forensic' computer techniques.").
57. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 11 (noting that data may be "deleted in
a way that makes it inaccessible without resort to expensive and uncertain
forensic techniques."); Withers, supra note 15, at 5.
58. Withers, supra note 15, at 5.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See supra Part IV for a detailed discussion of cost-shifting during
1813Summer 2005]
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5. Summary of Preservation Obligations
The court in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC summarized the
scope of a party's electronic preservation obligation as follows:
Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must
suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy
and put in place a "litigation hold" to ensure the
preservation of relevant documents. As a general rule, that
litigation hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes
(e.g., those typically maintained solely for the purpose of
disaster recovery), which may continue to be recycled on
the schedule set forth in the company's policy. On the other
hand, if backup tapes are accessible (i.e., actively used for
information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be
subject to the litigation hold.
However, it does not make sense to create one exception to
this general rule. If a company can identify where
particular employee documents are stored on backup tapes,
then the tapes storing the documents of "key players" to the
existing or threatened litigation should be preserved if the
information contained on those tapes is not otherwise
available. This exception applies to all backup tapes.
63
C. Sanctions
1. Introduction
There is a deeply-rooted notion that spoliators should not be able
to benefit from their wrongdoing. 64 Courts have broad discretion in
deciding the appropriate sanction for such wrongdoing and are able
to tailor sanctions to the unique factual circumstances of a given
case.
65
the course of electronic discovery.
63. 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
64. Trigon Ins. Co. v. U.S., 204 F.R.D. 277, 284 (E.D. Va. 2001). The
notion is captured in the maxim omnia presumuntur contra spoliatorem, which
means, "all things are presumed against a despoiler or wrongdoer." Id.
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (6th ed. 1997)).
65. Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 487, 492
(N.D. Ill. 2003); see also Liafail, Inc. v. Learning 2000, Inc., Nos. 01-599
GMS & 0 1-678 GMS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24803, at *8 (D. Del. Dec. 23,
1814
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This section will begin by discussing the sources of the court's
sanction power. It will then discuss the timeliness of a motion for
sanctions, namely what actions a court should take when a party has
requested sanctions prematurely. Next, it will discuss the two factors
a court must use to determine whether sanctions are warranted:
culpability and the connection between the destroyed evidence and
the case at hand. This section will go on to delineate the various
tests that federal circuits use in determining what type of sanction is
appropriate in a given case. It will further describe the most
frequently-used sanctions for spoliation, and discuss the various tests
that courts use to determine whether a default judgment is an
appropriate remedy.
2. Sources of a Court's Sanction Power
A court has statutory authority to sanction a party for discovery
violations.66 Fed R. Civ. P. 37 provides that "[i]f a party... fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery... the court in which
the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just .... ,,6 7 It is worth highlighting that a court may only impose
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 when "a court order or discovery
ruling of some sort has been violated.,
68
A court also has inherent authority to sanction a party for
discovery violations. 69 This authority stems from a court's ability to
2002) (noting that the court has broad discretion is fashioning spoliation
sanctions); Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 288 (stating that "judicial decisions which are
discretionary cannot be tied down to a fixed rule or formula. If such were the
case, courts would lose their flexibility in the sanctions process, and discretion
would lose its meaning.") (quoting Gates Rubber Co v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
167 F.R.D. 90, 102 (D. Colo. 1996))).
66. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19128, at *11 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2003); Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216; Danis
v. USN Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 868 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
68. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *11 n.5.
69. See AdvantaCare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004); Wiginton,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *11; Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216; Pennar
Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Sys., Ltd., No. 01-01734 EDL, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18,432, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2001); Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) at 868; Trigon, 204 F.R.D. at 285.
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"manage [its] own dockets and ensure the expeditious resolution of
cases."
70
3. Timeliness of a Motion for Sanctions
In most cases involving spoliation, it is impossible to determine
the extent and nature of the destroyed evidence. 7 1 In a small fraction
of cases, however, a party can glean what the extent of spoliation is
by looking through the backup tapes that house the previously-
72deleted documents. In such cases, the requesting party should
examine the backup tapes before asking the court to impose
sanctions on the spoliating party.73 If confronted by a premature
request for sanctions (i.e., a request made before a party has looked
through available backup tapes), a court will likely deny the party's
motion for sanctions without prejudice.
74
4. Factors in Determining Whether Sanctions Are Appropriate
a. Culpability
i. Introduction
The first factor a court will look at when deciding whether to
impose sanctions is a party's culpability with regard to the
spoliation. 75 Although spoliation is a bit of a misnomer (the term
70. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *11.
71. See id. at *25.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. In Wiginton, the moving party had access to three month's
worth of backup tapes. Id. at *26. The court denied the party's motion for
sanctions without prejudice, reasoning that the party could renew its motion if
its expert could discover relevant documents on the backup tapes. Id.
Similarly, a court should give a party the opportunity to correct or clarify the
discovery record by producing the requested documents. Liafail, Inc. v.
Learning 2000, Inc., Nos. 01-599 GMS & 01-678 GMS, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24,803, at *8 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 2002).
75. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
487, 492 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Liafail, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24803, at *9; Trigon
Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 287 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that
there must be "some quantum of blameworthiness" for the court to impose
sanctions).
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itself implies intent when, in fact, most spoliation is the result of
negligence or sheer ignorance),76 it is suggested that a negligent loss
of data "is compounded by counsel's failure to communicate the
facts to opposing counsel and the court, or because counsel
misrepresents the facts to the court, [or] attempts to cover up for its
failure .... 77
Culpability is generally divided into two categories: negligence
and bad faith. 78 Although both categories warrant the imposition of
sanctions, 79 the severity of the sanction imposed will correlate with a
party's level of culpability.
80
ii. Variations in required level of culpability
(a) negligence
Courts can impose sanctions for "mere negligence in
preserving" discoverable evidence. 8 1  It is common knowledge
within the legal community that negligence implies unreasonable
behavior. 82 Because negligent action is largely fact-specific, 83 there
76. See Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 39, at 6.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *20 (stating that a
culpable state of mind may be evidenced "by negligent actions or a flagrant
disregard of the duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence").
79. See, e.g., PRACTISING LAW INST., supra note 53, at 447-48 (explaining
that the failure to preserve electronic documents, "whether intentional or
inadvertent, may be deemed spoliation").
80. See, e.g., AdvantaCare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-
04496 JF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004)
(noting that courts should use their inherent sanctions powers with discretion
by "fashioning a sanction appropriate for the specific conduct abusive of the
judicial process"); Kucala, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 492 (explaining that a
court "should ensure that the sanction be proportionate to the offending
conduct").
81. Joseph, supra note 3, at 16.
82. Negligence is the "legal delinquency which results whenever a man
fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit, whether it be slight, ordinary
or great." Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 n.46
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1991)).
83. See MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Moulton, No. 03 Civ. 3613 (VM) (MHD),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,376, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004).
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is no mechanical formula that a court can use to determine whether a
party has behaved negligently in the course of document production.
Fortunately, case law on spoliation can provide a court with a few
telltale signs of negligence.
The most obvious example of negligence during the course of
production is when a party that is under a duty to produce evidence
attempts to find such evidence but fails in doing so.8 4 Despite good
faith efforts in trying to procure the missing evidence, such conduct
still rises to the level of negligence since the party was on notice that
the evidence was potentially relevant to litigation.
8 5
Courts have also found negligence where a party fails "to alter
normal business practices in response to pending or threatened
litigation. ' 86 For example, a party's behavior rises to the level of
negligence when the party is subjectively unaware that specific
relevant documents are scheduled for destruction according to the
party's document retention policy and the documents are destroyed. 7
Although case law is sparse, some courts have held corporate
parties may behave negligently by inappropriately delegating
preservation duties across the organization. For example, parties
have been found negligent when only some employees were warned
of pending litigation and told what to do with their computer files.
88
Similarly, corporations may behave negligently when they delegate
responsibility for preserving electronic data to low-level employees
who lack both litigation experience and an understanding of the legal
scope of the duty to preserve. 89 Lastly, corporate parties behave
negligently when they fail to follow-up on their preservation orders
to see if they are actually being adhered to.
90
84. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19128, at *25 (N.D. I11. Oct. 24, 2003).
85. See AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *13.
86. Todd L. Krause & Brian D. Coggio, Electronic Discovery: Where We
Are, and Where We're Headed, 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 16, 17 (2004). It is
worth noting that a company can also be found negligent when it fails to
implement any type of document retention policy whatsoever. Danis v. USN
Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
87. See Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19128, at *23.
88. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 39, at 3.
89. Id.
90. See Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 878.
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(b) bad faith
A party acts in bad faith when it destroys documents "for the
purpose of hiding adverse information" 91 or "obstructing the
litigation., 92 Because there is no certain way of ascertaining the
nature of the destroyed information (after all, the evidence is no
longer available), a "court may look at the circumstances
surrounding the destruction to determine if the non-producing party
acted in bad faith.",
93
The most unequivocal form of bad faith is "direct destruction.
94
Direct destruction occurs when a party intentionally destroys relevant
evidence for the purpose of hiding it.
95
A more equivocal form of bad faith is what courts have called
"willful blindness." 96 A party engages in willful blindness when it
knows that discoverable evidence is available but nonetheless allows
for its destruction. 97 At that point, a court will find that the reason
for the destruction was that "the party knew that relevant evidence
was contained in the documents and wanted to hide the adverse
information, rather than because the documents were scheduled to be
destroyed.
98
91. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *22 n.6 (quoting Mathis v.
John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998)).
92. MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Moulton, No. 03 Civ. 3613 (VM) (MHD),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,376, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004).
93. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *22 n.6.
94. See Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 878.
95. See, e.g., Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Sys., Ltd., No. 01-
01734 EDL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,432, at *16-'17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2001) (finding party acted in bad faith by deleting relevant webpages from a
webserver and altering the server's log files); Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co.,
56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 487, 494 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding party acted in
bad faith by using "Evidence Eliminator" software on his computer).
96. Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 878; Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19128, at *24.
97. See Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 878.
98. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *23. The company was
found willfully blind where it did not inform those in charge of document
retention that litigation was on the horizon. Id. at *23-*24.
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b. Connection between destroyed evidence and litigation
If the court concludes that a party's spoliation was negligent, but
not willful, it will then consider the connection between the
destroyed evidence and litigation.99 Some courts refer to this factor
as "relevancy,"' 00 while others label it "prejudice."' 0 ' Semantic
distinctions aside, this requirement simply mandates that the
"[d]estruction of evidence.., go to the heart of the case."'0 2
The destroyed documents must be relevant, such that a
reasonable trier of fact could infer that they would have supported
the moving party's claims.' °3  Although the loss of relevant
documents prejudices the requesting party by definition, the level of
prejudice can vary tremendously. 0 4  For example, the destroyed
evidence may have been the only proof of an issue or defense in the
case.10 5 Likewise, the unavailable evidence may have not been the
only proof available, but it may have been the best proof.10 6 So long
as the court is satisfied that the evidence was relevant and some
prejudice will ensue, the moving party will have met its burden.
10 7
The court will then take the degree of prejudice into account when it
99. In cases of willful spoliation, "the spoliator's mental culpability [is]
itself evidence of the relevance of the documents destroyed"; in cases of
negligent spoliation, "it cannot be inferred from the conduct of the spoliator
that the evidence would even have been harmful to him." Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citations omitted).
100. See, e.g., Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 221; MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v.
Moulton, No. 03 Civ. 3613 (VM) (MHD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,376, at
*12 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Md. 2003).
101. See, e.g., Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co.,56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
487, 492-93 (N.D. I11. 2003); Danis, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 873.
102. AdvantaCare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004).
103. Liafail, Inc. v. Learning 2000, Inc., Nos. 01-599 GMS & 01-678 GMS,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24,803, at *9 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 2002); Zubulake, 221
F.R.D. at 220.
104. Danis, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 874 (reminding that "[t]he
prejudice suffered from the destruction of documents can take many forms.").
105. See, e.g., id. (noting that this is the most severe form of prejudice).
106. See, e.g., id.
107. See, e.g., id. at 873-74.
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decides what type of sanction to impose.1
0 8
5. Determining the Appropriate Sanction(s)
Once a court has determined that sanctions are warranted, it will
go on to consider what type of sanction to impose. In making this
determination, a court will consider a variety of factors. This section
will delineate the test that the majority of courts use and will
conclude with a brief description of the test that the Fourth Circuit
has enunciated.
a. General test
The available case law on this topic, outside of the Fourth
Circuit, suggests that a court should consider three ultimate goals
when fashioning a sanction:
(1) deterring parties from spoliation;
(2) placing the risk of erroneous judgment on the party who
initially created the risk; and
(3) restoring the prejudiced party to the position it would
have been if had the spoliation not occurred. 109
b. Fourth circuit test
The Fourth Circuit has devised "a five-factor test to "guide trial
courts in determining appropriate sanctions to impose.... ,0 The
factors are as follows:
(1) the surprise to the party against whom the evidence
would be offered;
(2) the ability of that party to cure the surprise;
(3) the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt
the trial;
(4) the importance of the discovery; and
(5) the explanation of the non-disclosing party for its failure
108. See discussion infra Part VII.C.5.
109. See, e.g., MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Moulton, No. 03 Civ. 3613 (VM)
(MHD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11376, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004);
Trigon Ins. Co. v. U.S., 204 F.R.D. 277, 287 (E.D. Va. 2001).
110. Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D.
93, 103 (D. Md. 2003).
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to provide the discovery. 11
6. Typical Sanctions
In general, a court may sanction a spoliating party in one of four
ways: (1) the court may enter a default judgment against the
spoliating party;" l2 (2) the "[c]ourt may instruct the jury that it may
draw an inference adverse to the" spoliating party;" 3 (3) the "[c]ourt
may issue civil contempt sanctions, which coerce a party into
compliance with the court's order and/or compensate the plaintiff for
the violation"; 114 or (4) the "[c]ourt may assess attorney's fees". "1
5
This section will describe each of the remedies in turn, focusing
specifically on the practicalities and considerations that come into
play with regard to each sanction.
a. Defaultjudgment
Because "[j]ustice is best served by hearing cases on their
merits," 1 6 courts consider the entering of a default judgment to be a
severe sanction. 117 As such, they carefully consider a number of
11. Id. (citing Southern States Rack and Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin Williams,
318 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2003)). The court elaborated that the factors "provide[]
a useful measure to insure against unwarranted imposition of sanctions that
may be so severe as to end, or severely damage, a party's ability to present its
case at trial." Id. at 103 n.8.
112. AdvantaCare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004) (citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,45 (1991)).
113. Id. at *11-*12 (citing Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir.
1993); Akonia v. U.S., 938 F.2d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1991)).
114. AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *12 (citing Whittaker
Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 1992)).
115. Id. (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
116. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19,128, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2003).
117. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219
F.R.D. 93, 102 (D. Md. 2003) (declaring that case-determinative remedies may
be "draconian"); Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *20 (reminding
that default judgment is a "harsh" sanction only warranted in extreme
situations); Kucala Enters. v. Auto Wax Co., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 487,
492 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (stressing that default judgment should be applied only in
"extreme scenarios"); Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Sys., Ltd., No.
01-01734 EDL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18,432, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
1822
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factors when deciding the appropriateness of a default judgment.
This section will begin by delineating the most typical factors a court
considers when deciding whether to impose a default judgment. It
will conclude by delineating the Ninth Circuit's requirements for
default judgment.
i. General requirements for default judgment
Although there is no general systematic test for determining the
appropriateness of a default judgment, courts have enunciated a
handful of factors to be considered when determining whether this
sanction is appropriate.18
As a threshold issue, a court will not enter a default judgment
unless the spoliating party acted with willfulness, bad faith, or
fault, 119 and there is clear and convincing evidence of such
misconduct. 1
20
Although courts are not required to first impose less drastic
sanctions, they will typically apply default judgments only when
"lesser sanctions have proven futile."'
' 2 1
Courts may also consider prejudice to the victim when
determining the efficacy of a default judgment. For example, courts
have stated that a default judgment is appropriate when a party
destroys the only existing piece of evidence.
22
ii. Ninth circuit's requirements for default judgment
(a) extraordinary circumstances
A court will first consider whether extraordinary circumstances
2001) (noting that default judgment is a "punitive" sanction); Danis v. USN
Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 828, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(referring to default judgment as "the most severe sanction").
118. The cases cited infra note 117 do not suggest that a court must consider
all of these factors before imposing a default judgment; most courts have only
verbalized a consideration of one or two factors at a time.
119. See, e.g., Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *20; Kucala, 56
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 492; see discussion supra Part VII.C.4.a.ii.(a)(b) for
a more detailed description of culpable states of mind.
120. Pennar Software Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18432, at *16.
121. Id. at *13 (citing Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir.
1981)).
122. Wiginton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,128, at *21.
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exist so as to justify entering a default judgment. Although Ninth
Circuit case law is unclear on what constitutes "extraordinary
circumstances,"' 123 it is suggested that "extraordinary circumstances
exist where there is a pattern of disregard for Court orders and
deceptive litigation tactics that threaten to interfere with the rightful
decision of a case."' 124 In other words, a court should only enter a
default judgment when the spoliation "eclipse[s] entirely the
possibility of a just result."'
' 25
(b) willfulness, bad faith, or fault
A court will next consider whether the destruction of documents
can be attributed to the producing party's willfulness, bad faith, or
fault. A party possesses such states of mind when it engages in
"[d]isobedient conduct not shown to be outside [its] control."'
' 26
(c) efficacy of lesser sanctions
Before imposing a default judgment, a court will consider the
efficacy of less severe sanctions. Rejection of lesser sanctions is
nevertheless appropriate in two circumstances: "(1) when no lesser
sanction could both punish [d]efendants and deter others similarly
tempted and (2) when the facts show that deceptive conduct has
occurred and will continue."'
127
123. AdvantaCare Health Partners, LP v. Access IV, No. C 03-04496 JF,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004).
124. Id. (citing Valley Eng'rs, Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057-
58 (9th Cir. 1998)).
125. Id.
126. Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hyde
& Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also AdvantaCare,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *16. In AdvantaCare, the producing party
intentionally destroyed files in response to a cease and desist letter. Id. The
party then purchased and used a deletion software to remove thousands of files
from his computer. Id. The court found this conduct to be consistent with
willfulness, bad faith, or fault. Id. For a more detailed description of
negligence and bad faith, see discussion supra Part VII.C.4.a.ii.(a)-(b).
127. AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *17 (citing Computer
Assoc. Int'l v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166 (D. Col. 1990); see also
TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987); Chism
v. Nat'l Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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(d) relationship between misconduct and matters in controversy
"Destruction of evidence must go to the heart of the case."
128
The Ninth Circuit has held that "spoliation of evidence raises a
presumption that the destroyed evidence goes to the merits of the
case, and further, that such evidence was adverse to the party that
destroyed it."
129
(e) prejudice to victim and relevant government interests
The Ninth Circuit uses prejudice to the victim as an optional
consideration in deciding whether default judgment is appropriate.'
30
In cases where the government is a party, the court may further
account for the effects that dismissal would have on public policy
concerns. 131
b. Adverse inference instruction
A court also has the option of instructing the jury that it may
draw an inference adverse to the spoliating party. 132 An adverse
128. Advantacare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *19.
129. Id. (citing Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682
F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v.
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 557 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Am.
Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166 (D. Col. 1990)) (court found sufficient
connection between the misconduct and matters in controversy where deleted
computer files were relevant to plaintiffs' claims of computer fraud, unfair
competition, misappropriation, and breach of contract). For a more detailed
description of relevancy, see discussion supra Part VII.C.4.b.
130. AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *20 (citing Halaco
Engineering Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 382 (9th Cir. 1988)) (finding
sufficient prejudice where deleted computer files were central to the merits of
plaintiffs claim). For a more detailed description of relevancy, see discussion
supra Part VII.C.4.b.
131. Halaco, 843 F.2d at 382.
132. See, e.g., AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,835, at *17. "The
adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one not. The
evidentiary rationale is the common sense observation that a party who has
notice that a document is relevant to litigation and who destroys the document
is more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party in the
same position who does not destroy the document. The other rationale relates
to sanctions' punitive and preventative effects." Id. at *21-*22 (citation
omitted); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 22, 2003); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003); Liafail, Inc. v. Learning 2000, Inc.,
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inference instruction "is not to be given lightly,"'133 however. The
Zubulake court summarized the effects of an adverse inference
instruction as follows:
In practice, an adverse inference instruction often ends
litigation-it is too difficult a hurdle for the spoliator to
overcome. The in terrorem effect of an adverse inference is
obvious. When a jury is instructed that it may "infer that
the party who destroyed potentially relevant evidence did so
'out of a realization that the [evidence was] unfavorable,"'
the party suffering this instruction will be hard-pressed to
prevail on the merits. Accordingly, the adverse inference
instruction is an extreme sanction and should not be given
lightly.
134
In deciding whether to provide an adverse inference instruction,
courts generally consider the spoliating party's degree of
culpability. 1
35
c. Civil contempt sanctions
Courts also have the authority to impose sanctions under their
civil contempt power. 136  Such civil contempt sanctions are
appropriate where a party has violated a court-issued preliminary
injunction. 137 Civil contempt sanctions are wholly remedial and are
employed both to "coerce [the spoliating party] into compliance with
court orders or to compensate the complainant for losses
Nos. 01-599 GMS & 01-678 GMS, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24803, at *9 (D.
Del. Dec. 23, 2002); Pennar Software Corp. v. Fortune 500 Sys., Ltd., No. 01-
01734 EDL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18432, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2001).
133. Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 100.
134. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 219-20 (footnotes omitted).
135. See Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 101; see also Liafail, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24803, at * 12 (stating that juries are permitted to infer that a party's
"bad faith alone is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that the missing evidence was unfavorable to that
party").
136. See, e.g., AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *23.
137. See, e.g., Harris Ry. Elecs., LLC v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., No.
99-070-GMS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16329, at *19-*20 (D. Del. Aug. 18,
2004); AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *23; Pennar, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18432, at *12.
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sustained."'
138
Courts typically impose the minimum sanction necessary to
impose compliance.' 39 When determining the severity and duration
of the sanction, courts must consider the "character and magnitude of
the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable
effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result
desired."' 140 Furthermore, a court must always provide the spoliating
party with an opportunity to bring itself into compliance with the
injunction before imposing sanctions.' 4 ' Lastly, the sanction must
come to an end once the party ceases to act in contempt of 
court.142
d. Attorney's fees
Although the "American Rule" generally prohibits fee-shifting,
a court may impose attorney's fees when a party willfully disobeys a
court order or acts in bad faith.'
43
D. Spoliation 's Future
1. Proposed Electronic Discovery Rules
"Although the federal discovery rules are well drafted to be
flexible, it is becoming increasingly clear that they do not adequately
accommodate the new forms of information technology."' 144 In
response to the rules' imperfections, organized bar groups, litigants,
lawyers, and judges began urging the Civil Rules Committee to
consider rule changes to "accommodate the distinctive features" of
138. Bradley v. Am. Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir. 2004); see
also AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *23; Pennar 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18432, at *17-*18 (stating that "[c]ivil contempt is a coercive
measure designed to force a party to comply with the Court's order").
139. AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *23-*24.
140. Id. at *24 (quoting Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510,
517 (9th Cir. 1992)).
141. Id.; see Pennar, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18432, at *18 (noting that
"[c]ontempt is inappropriate where a party has taken 'all the reasonable steps it
can take to comply"').
142. See, e.g., AdvantaCare, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16835, at *24.
143. See, e.g., id. at *27; Pennar, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18432, at *11. For
a detailed discussion of cost shifting during the course of electronic discovery,
see supra Part IV.
144. ADVISORY, supra note 3, at 3.
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electronic discovery. 145
The Committee responded by drafting proposed amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the twin aims of "making
the rules better able to accommodate the qualitative and quantitative
differences between electronic discovery and conventional discovery
and... [providing] a framework to resolve the issues electronic
discovery presents."' 146  Although the Committee recognized that
changes in technology would continue to occur in rapid and
unpredictable ways, it reminded the legal community of the
importance of having both a structured and flexible set of discovery
rules. 
147
a. Proposed amendment to rule 26(b)(2)
As it stands, parties are obliged to preserve all evidence to the
extent required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 148 The proposed
amendment to Rule 26(b) reads as follows:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible. On motion by the requesting party, the
responding party must show that the information is not
reasonably accessible. If that showing is made, the court
may order discovery of the information for good cause and
may specify terms and conditions for such discovery. 1
49
i. Defining "reasonably accessible"
In terms of spoliation, the proposed amendment would alter the
scope of the duty to preserve, limiting it only to "reasonably
accessible" information. 150 Whether information was reasonably
145. Id. at 2.
146. Id. at 5.
147. See id. at 20.
148. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19128, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2003); Danis v. USN
Communications, Inc., 53 Fed. R. Serv. (West) 828, 870 (N.D. Ill. 2000);
Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., 220 F.R.D. 429,
434 (W.D. Pa. 2004); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D. Md. 2003). For a detailed discussion of the scope
of electronic discovery, see supra Part III.
149. ADVISORY, supra note 3, at app. 6.
150. See id. app. at 34-35.
1828
accessible would depend on a variety of circumstances. "One
referent would be whether the party itself routinely accesses or uses
the information.... [If so,] the information would ordinarily be
considered reasonably accessible."' 5 1 Another consideration would
be the time and cost involved in restoring the data.' 52 Information
"deleted in a way that makes it inaccessible without resort to
expensive and uncertain forensic techniques" would not ordinarily be
considered reasonably accessible, despite the fact that "technology
may provide the capability to retrieve and produce it through
extraordinary efforts."'
53
The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) appears to be more
sympathetic toward companies' temporal and financial restraints,
recognizing feasible production does not necessarily equate with
practicable production. By essentially redefining reasonable
behavior in a more realistic manner, the Advisory Committee has
severely narrowed the scope of sanctionable behavior. As such, if
the proposed amendment is accepted, one should expect the number
of legitimate spoliation claims to decrease.
ii. Function of the "good cause" analysis
Despite the difficulty of retrieving data, a party may still have a
duty to preserve evidence that its adversary has "good cause" to
request. 154 "The good-cause analysis would balance the requesting
party's need for the information and the burden on the responding
party.' ' 155 The rule would be used to "discourage costly, speculative,
duplicative, or unduly burdensome discovery of computer data and
systems," whereas "[m]ore expensive forms of production, such as
production of word-processing files with all associated metadata or
production of data in specified nonstandard format, [would] be
151. Id. app. at 12.
152. Id. app. at 11.
153. Id. Note that this standard starkly contrasts with current protocol for
deleted data, which demands that a party exercise all available options to
retrieve the deleted data, regardless of cost or difficulty. See discussion supra
Part VII.B.4. The Committee simply felt that it would be "sensible" to limit
discovery in this manner. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 12.
154. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 12.
155. Id. app. at 14.
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conditioned upon a showing of need or sharing expenses."'
56
Like the reasonable accessibility requirement, the good cause
analysis takes into account the technological realities of the modem
business world. By preventing requesting parties from burying their
adversaries with unnecessary production requests, the proposed
amendment would presumably allow companies to maintain their
day-to-day business obligations because they would not have to
expend the manpower necessary to produce an overwhelming
number of documents. Likewise, one would expect the number of
valid spoliation claims to decrease, as the producing party would
have to make a preliminary good cause showing before moving for
sanctions.
b. Proposed amendment to rule 37
Parties found to have spoliated evidence can be subject to
sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.157 The proposed
amendment to Rule 37 comes in the form of a new subdivision-
subdivision (f)-that details sanctions to be imposed for electronic
discovery violations:
(F) ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. Unless a
party violated an order in the action requiring it to preserve
electronically stored information, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on the party for failing to
provide such information if: (1) the party took reasonable
steps to preserve the information after it knew or should
have known the information was discoverable in the action;
and (2) the failure resulted from loss of the information
because of the routine operation of the party's electronic
information system.'
58
156. Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 11.446 (quoted in ADVISORY,
supra note 3, app. at 14).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
158. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 31-32.
1830
i. Defining "reasonable steps"'
159
"The reasonableness of the steps taken to preserve electronically
stored information must be measured in at least three dimensions.
'' 60
The "outer-limit" of reasonableness is set by Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1 ). 16 1
The new Rule 26(b)(2) provision sets a second limit, requiring
that electronically stored information that is not reasonably
accessible must be provided only on court order for good cause.' 
62
The third and final limit would depend upon "what the party
knows about the nature of the litigation," because such information
would "inform [the party's] judgment about what subjects are
pertinent to the action and which people and systems are likely to
have relevant information."' 163 Once those subjects and information
systems are identified, e-mail records and electronic files of key
individuals or departments "will be the most obvious candidates for
159. The proposed reasonable steps requirement is not significantly different
than the existing duty to preserve. The most notable difference is that
reasonable accessibility (as defined per the proposed amendments to Rule
26(b)(1)) would serve as a guidepost in determining whether the steps were
reasonable pursuant to the proposed amendments to Rule 37. For a more
detailed description of the reasonable accessibility requirement, see discussion
supra Part VII.D. 1 .b.i.
160. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 34.
161. Id. The rule reads as follows:
(B) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMrrs. Unless otherwise limited by order
of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows: (1) IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i),
(ii), and (iii).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
162. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 34. For a more detailed description of
the proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2), see discussion supra Part
VII.D. 1 .a.i-ii.
163. Id. app. at 35. Note that "other candidates for preservation will be more
specific to the litigation and information system." Id.
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preservation."1
64
In assessing the steps taken by the party, the court would
consider what the party knew or reasonably should have known
when it took steps to preserve information. 165 "Often, taking no
steps at all would not suffice, but the specific steps to be taken would
vary widely depending on the nature of the party's electronic
information system and the nature of the litigation."'
166
A court could also consider reasonableness in light of any
existing "statutory or regulatory provision[s] for preserving
information. Although violation of such a provision [would] not
automatically preclude the protections of Rule 37(f)," statutory or
regulatory provisions might serve as guideposts in determining
whether the party "took reasonable steps to preserve the information
for litigation." 
67
ii. Document retention policies
The proposed incorporation of document retention policies into
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "is an open-ended attempt to
describe the ways in which a specific piece of electronically stored
information disappears without a conscious human direction to
destroy that specific information."' 68 The purpose of the subsection
would be to encourage parties to design efficient electronic
information storage infrastructures that serve the parties' needs.'
69
The safe harbor 170 would not be absolute, however, as "[d]ifferent
considerations would apply if a system were deliberately designed to
destroy litigation-related material."17
Although the proposed amendment would provide a "narrow
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. app. at 34. It is worth noting that violation of such a statutory or
regulatory provisions may subject the spoliator to sanctions in another
proceeding, "but the court may not impose sanctions in the action if it
concludes that the party's steps satisfy Rule 37(f)(1)." Id. app. at 35-36.
169. Id. app. at 34.
170. As used in this part, "safe harbor" refers to action that is immune from
discovery sanctions.
171. ADVISORY, supra note 3, app. at 34 (emphasis added).
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'safe harbor"' for a spoliating party, 172 the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee has yet to determine the degree of culpability that would
preclude eligibility from this safe harbor.
173
iii. A note on preservation orders
Rule 37(f) would not apply if the party's failure to provide the
evidence resulted from its violation of a preservation order, since
such an order should ordinarily be understood to include
electronically stored information. 174 As such, a court might impose
sanctions for violating a preservation order even if the party took
reasonable steps to comply with the order. 175 If the party violated an
order "in ways that are unrelated to the party's current inability to
provide the electronically stored information at issue," however, the
party would continue to benefit from Rule 37(f)'s protections.176
Because of the breadth of the new safe harbor provision, one
could speculate that courts would begin to grant preservation orders
more frequently. In other words, a court could essentially
circumvent safe harbor immunity by standardizing the issuance of
preservation orders, which, as previously noted, are designed for
extraordinary circumstances. If preservation orders became the rule
rather than the exception, the "safety" of the discovery safe harbor
would be rendered illusory, as would any supposed changes Rule 37
was intended to bring about.
172. Id. at 17.
173. Id. app. at 32 (star footnote). In its footnote, the Committee also
provided an example of an alternate version of a new Rule 37(f) framed in
terms of intentional or reckless failure to preserve for comment toward
possible codification. It reads as follows:
(F) ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. A court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information deleted or lost as a result of the
routine operation of the party's electronic system unless: (1) the party
intentionally or recklessly failed to preserve the information; or (2) the
party violated an order issued in the action requiring the preservation
of information.
Id. app. at 32-33 (star footnote).
174. Id. app. at 36.
175. Id.
176. Id.
SPOLIATION 1833Summer 2005]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1803
2. Conclusion
Although courts have made significant advances in developing a
spoliation framework, they will never be equipped to fill all the
remaining gaps in e-discovery law. 177  If accepted, the proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will no doubt
serve as a useful tool to judges and litigators alike by allowing both
parties to adhere to a more unified, yet flexible, framework.
In the meantime, both judges and litigators have been forced to
self-educate in the sphere of e-discovery. Judges have become
relatively technologically-savvy, which, in turn, has made them less
tolerant of head-in the-sand-type recalcitrant behavior by spoliating
parties. 17 8  Litigators, on the other hand, have a myriad of
e-discovery-based educational tools at their disposal, allowing them
to keep abreast of both legal developments and professional services
to facilitate the arduous task of undergoing this unique type of
discovery. 1
79
177. Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy
e-Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53, 29 (2004), available at
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl0i5/article53.pdf. The author lists four reasons
for judicial inefficiency in creating a cohesive e-discovery framework: (1)
most reported discovery cases come from trial courts and, as a result, have
little precedential value; (2) appellate courts rarely have the opportunity to
provide guidance in this area because few discovery cases get appealed; (3)
when such cases are appealed, the level of review is deferential, leaving most
discovery determinations within the trial judge's discretion; and (4) "the
reported decisions tend to involve obstructionist conduct at the most egregious
end of the spectrum, [which provides] insufficient guidance to those acting in a
mainstream manner." Id.
178. Id. 37.
179. LexisNexis' "Applied Discovery," for example, allows users to
subscribe to e-discovery newsletters and even enroll in an "E-Discovery Best
Practices Certification Course." Further information is available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/. Other companies, such as Kroll
Ontrack, maintain a free database of current e-discovery case law, and can be
hired as discovery experts. Further information is available at http://
www.krollontrack.com/.
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